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The paper extends the familiar standard tax competition model for the 
possibility of cross-border commuting by introducing an additional level of 
jurisdictions. For separating the impact of landownership and cross-border 
commuting different schemes of landownership are considered. It will be 
shown that the possibility of cross-border commuting increases the problem 
of tax competition since an additional indirect fiscal externality arises via the 
potential reallocation of labor. The resulting change in the supply of publicly 
provided goods depends crucially on the considered structure of 
landownership respectively on the aim of the local policy makers. If the tax 
burden can be exported via external possession of land, the undersupply of 
publicly provided goods will be reduced and in the extreme case, an 
oversupply may arise. 
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Fiscal competition on the local level 
May commuting be a source of fiscal crises? 
 
1 Introduction 
One of the key results in the extensive literature on fiscal competition is the 
resulting under-supply of publicly provided goods if decentralized 
governments which are limited in the tax instruments set act uncoordinated. 
Intending to attract mobile factors of production, each local government has 
an incentive to reduce the tax rate levied with on. If the governments are 
limited to taxes which are related to highly mobile factors the resulting supply 
of publicly provided goods will also be inefficiently low. Based on the 
intuition of OATES (1972), ZODROW and MIESZKOWSKI (1986a) and WILSON 
(1986) reproduced the result in the context of formal models. Since this time, 
the basic structure of fiscal competition models has been extend for several 
aspects, giving a more detailed view on the problem of fiscal competition
1. 
One main purpose of the further analysis in competitive models has been the 
introduction other mobile factors of production as firms and labor. However, 
the introduction of ￿labor mobility￿ is usually done in the sense of household 
mobility. Thus, individuals may choose freely the jurisdiction of living and 
working for maximizing their utility. Nevertheless, households have been still 
limited to supply their labor force only in their community of residence and, 
consequently, any firm could only hire workers living at the same location. In 
other words the usual approach rules out the possibility of cross-border 
commuting. In such a structure, the governments have consequently an 
                                           
1 An overview of the fiscal competition literature gives for example: WILSON (1999). For an introduction in 
the theory of fiscal competition see e.g. WELLISCH (2000). 2 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
essential interest in a prospering economic activity in their jurisdiction as the 
earnings out of the labor force and local business activity are directly 
connected. 
For the geographic situation of the United States, cross-border commuting 
may be a limited phenomena in metropolitan areas and therefore of reduced 
interest in the context of local tax competition. However, in Europe especially 
in Germany, the density of population is higher and therefore the distance 
between cities lower, even sometimes neglectable. Picking up the situation of 
the ￿Rhein-Ruhr-Gebiet￿ in the Northeastern part of Germany, cities are 
nearly spatially merged and differences between intra- and inner-city 
commuting are ignorable. Furthermore, in Germany costs of commuting are 
deductible on the income tax while for example the United States and the 
United Kingdom do not provide the possibility to exclude these work-related 
expenses from the tax base.
2 Thus, the question arises how the possibility of 
cross-border commuting changes the results concerning the inefficient supply 
of public goods. 
The issue of commuting is not new in the literature of taxation. GORDON 
(1983) has formally illustrated the basic intuition of the fiscal externalities 
caused by limited taxation instruments and factor mobility, considering also 
the possibility of commuting. SASKAI (1991) introduced also the possibility of 
inter-city commuting, however focusing on optimal taxation while neglecting 
strategic behavior of the governments. In the context of the tax competition 
literature, BRAID (1996,  2000) considers labor mobility by commuting, 
however, concentrates on the choices of tax instruments.  
As stressed by BRAID (2000), in a two-factor, constant-to-scale production 
model where labor as well as capital is costless mobile the provision of public 
goods would collapse completely if only source-based, distortionary taxes 
                                           
2 Concerning the efficiency of deductibility of commuting costs see Wrede (2001).   Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  3 
 
were available. The reason for such a non-active government can be found in 
the outflow of the entire production to the community with the lowest 
taxation. Besides the consideration of transaction costs as in BRAID (2000) the 
outflow of the whole production can be avoided if the production is not 
linear-homogenous in the mobile factors. Thus, a third immobile factor such 
as a publicly provided input, a natural resource without limited ownership or 
land could be assumed.  
However, considering land as a third factor of production in a local context 
involves further problems concerning the distribution of landownership. As in 
BRAID (1996), business land as a third factor of production may be completely 
owned by local residents. Therefore, the focus seems to be only shifted from 
labor income to land rents, without any change concerning the interest in a 
prospering economic activity in the jurisdiction.
3  
Nevertheless, focusing on land rents whether explicitly or implicitly seems to 
be not adequate. Firstly, while a representative endowment with labor for 
every resident is tenable, in the case of land the same assumption appears 
highly fragile. As in reality the distribution of land ownership is usually 
asymmetric, for a justifiable assumption of explicit or implicit land rent 
maximization by the governments, we would have to assume either an 
enormous influence of land owners on the decisions of the government or 
directly a majority of land owners versus the rest of the local residents. Both 
seem to be unrealistic. Secondly, especially in a local context, land ownership 
needs not be limited to local residents of the same community. Thus, the tax 
                                           
3  Considering the maximization of land rents as the target function of governments is a standard assumption 
in models with household mobility, see e.g. BRUECKNER (1983),  WILDASIN (1986), HOYT (1991a), 
KRELOVE (1992),  HENDERSON (1994); BURBIDGE and MYERS (1994) and WILSON (1997). The usual 
argument for this approach is the migration reaction of households on interregional differences in the level 
of reachable utility. Thus, governments would have to take a reservation utility level as given and any local 
attempt to increase utility would lead to migration reactions which immediately equalize the utility level 
between the jurisdictions. For another argumentation see WILSON (1995). 4 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
burden shifted from the mobile factor to the immobile factor land could be 
partly interregionally exported due to the external landownership. Finally, 
land can also be used for the purpose of housing. For the aim of maximizing 
land rents, governments could also try to attract new residents implying an 
increased demand for land.  
The purpose of the paper is to analyze more closely the impact of cross-
border commuting on the decision of benevolent local governments. A special 
aspect is thereby to separate the impact of cross-border commuting on the 
supply of public goods from the considered structure of land-ownership. 
Therefore, the paper contains different schemes of land endowment and 
considerable target-functions of the government. In the second section, the 
structure of the model is presented and the general rule for the efficient supply 
of the public provided good is stated. In section 3 is shown that the presented 
model contains the standard tax competition model of ZODROW/MIESZKOWSKI 
as a special case and the basic intuition of tax competition models will be 
illustrated. In section 4, the possibility of cross-border commuting will be 
introduced whereby different schemes of land-ownership are taken into 
consideration. Section 5 brings the results together and gives an idea of 
possible extensions. 
2 Basic  Model 
Consider a world economy consisting of M regions. Within each region living 
N  households, which are spread equally on J  identical communities 
1,..., jJ = . In the following we focus on the community i with  :, ij m = , thus 
i describe the community j in the region m and the total number of 
communities is given by I MJ =× . Concentrating on the efficiency aspect at 
the symmetric case, the communities are identical in per￿capita endowments, 
technologies, preferences and amount of immobile households.    Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  5 
 
The representative individual￿s utility in i correspond to a strictly quasi-
concave function  () ,
i
ii UU x z ≡ , where  i x  denotes the consumption of a 
private (numeraire) good and  i z  the per-capita level of a publicly provided 
good which can be consumed by an individual residing in i. Note that the 
publicly provided good is completely rival in consumption.
4 Each household 
has three potential sources of income: wage income out of an inelastic supply 
of labor and non-labor income out of interest payments and land rents.  
The supply of business land  i L  is fixed in any community; however, the 
distribution of land ownership will be considered separately in each chapter. 
Both capital K and labor N are perfectly mobile within each region, but capital 
is also interregional mobile and can move between the regions. Thus, we can 
interpret each region as a valley, where within the distance between firms is 
relatively low, whilst daily commuting from one region to another is 
prohibitively expensive.  
The factors are used to produce a homogeneous private good x by a constant 
return to scale production technology. The production function, represented 
by  (,, )
ii i i FF N K L ≡ , satisfies the usual assumptions
5, whereby  , ,
ii i NKL  
symbolize the factor inputs while  ,, ii i NKL  are aggregated factor endowments 
of the community i. Since the production is characterized by linear 
homogeneity without any pure public input, we need not to consider firms 
explicitly. Supposing profit maximization in the production, at competitive 
markets the use of labor, land, and capital is ruled by: 
                                           
4  In the given symmetric structure of communities, the assumption of a publicly provided private good could 
also be dropped for a pure local public good without any changes in the results as we neglect household 
mobility. 
5  The function is twice continuously differentiable for each variable; marginal products are positive  0
i
S F >  
and diminishing  0, , ,
i
SS F SK L N <= . Furthermore  0
ii ii
NN KK NK NK FF FF − >  holds, so that F is strictly 
concave in N and K. Finally all factors are complements  0; , , , ;











































ii wl  and 
i ρ  are the (gross) factor prices of labor, land, and capital at 
the community i. A global capital market equilibrium is realized if the 
exogenous given global supply of capital is equal to the total demand for 
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Each labor market has to be cleared on the regional level, so a labor market 












= ∑∑ . 
The land market has to be cleared on the local level; hence, a land market 
equilibrium is attained if the following equation holds 
(6) for all in
i
i L Li I = . 
To facilitate the structure the land market equilibrium given by equation (6) 
will be directly considered in the production function. Since capital is 
completely mobile, the net interest rate on capital r must be equal in all 
communities and regions with  : ,
i rri I = ∀∈ . Neglecting commuting costs, the 
wage rate 
m w  within a region must be equalized in an equilibrium with 
, :,
mm j ww j J =∀ ∈ .  
Each of the communities is ruled by a benevolent government with the aim of 
maximizing residences￿ utility. Assuming a representative household, we 
need not to distinguish between the labor supply of the local residence and the   Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  7 
 
number of households thus  i N  is used for both. Municipal policy variables 
are the business capital tax rate  i τ  and the provision of a publicly provided 
good  i Z . There are no spillover effects in the provision of  i Z  and one unit of 
the private good can be costless transformed into one unit of the public good.
6 
Therefore, the budget constraint of the local governments is given by:  
(7) 
i
i K Z τ =  with  
(8)  ii r τ ρ = −  
Taking into account the EULER-theorem and the fact that households consume 
their entire income, aggregated consumption of private goods is given by:  
(9)  ( ) ( ) (,, )
ii i m i i i i
ii i i i i i i x NF N K L r KK w NN l Ly NK τ =+ − + − − + − . 
For having the possibility to show the implication of different structures of 
land ownership, we define 
i y  as the household￿s income out of 
landownership. 
Equation (9) is general enough to show the implications of the standard tax 
competition models with immobile labor as well as the impact of commuting 
in a decentralized region under different schemes of landownership. 
Independent of the assumption concerning cross-border commuting, the level 
of publicly provided goods is efficient if the modified SAMUELSON-rule holds. 
Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution of the public services  i z  for the 













                                           
6  The Marginal Rate of Transformation is equal to one:  1 xz MRT = . 8 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
3  The standard tax competition model as the regional case  
Let us start with the standard case of separated labor markets without any tax 
exports, which refers closely to the model structure of ZODROW  and 
MIESZKOWSKI (1986a). For this we set by definition  1 J ≡ . Hence, the 
demand for labor in each jurisdiction must be identical with the labor supply 
of the local residents:  
(11) 
i
i NN ≡  
Furthermore, we assume that the households own only land in the region of 
living. Under these assumptions, we can express the income out of the 
immobile factor as residual and the aggregated consumption in the local 
community reduce to: 
(12)  ( ) (,,)
ii i





im j m j i i i
mj i
jj
yl L N N y l L J
==
=⇔ = = ∑∑ . 
As stated, the local government wants to maximize the utility of its residents. 
Governments play thereby a NASH-game in tax rates, with the assumption that 
all policy makers set their tax rates simultaneously, taking the tax rates of the 
other jurisdictions as given.
7 Choosing the tax rate, the level of publicly 
provided goods is also determined by the budget constraint.  
(13)  ( ) ,
i
ii i Max U U x z
τ =  
  ( ) .. ( , , )
ii i
ii i i i i
i
ii







The first order condition is therefore given by: 
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7  As shown by Wildasin (1988), the alternative approach, using the public expenditures as the strategic 
variable, does not imply in general the same equilibrium.    Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  9 
 
Since in the symmetric case of identical regions the second term in the first 
bracket is zero, equation (14) simplifies to 
(14)￿  ( )
1
, 1
ii i i zx K MRS τ ε
−

















Hence, only if the government is not afraid of driving away productive capital 
by an increase of the tax rate, the decentralized decision will be efficient. 
Otherwise for  1 0
ii Kτ ε −< < , the decentralized supply of the publicly provided 
good will always be inefficiently low as the marginal rate of substitution is 
higher than unity,  , 1
ii zx MRS > .  
The tax elasticity of capital is thereby influenced by the number of regions. 
Before starting with a finite number of regions, let us first consider the case of 
a given world market interest rate, which is the same as increasing the number 
of regions to infinity M →∞. Then, taking into account a cleared capital 



























From the point of view of a single jurisdiction, the cost of financing the public 
activity has two components. The first cost component is the normal revenue 
effect, arising always with any tax activity. Secondly, the local municipality 
takes further into account that any source based taxes on a mobile base as 
capital provokes a reduced employment of the taxed mobile factor in the own 
jurisdiction. Thus, the outflow of the mobile factor decreases the local 
economic activity and therefore the local income out of the immobile factors. 
Hence, the burden of the tax is shifted from the mobile factor to the immobile 
factor of production. As MACDOUGALL  (1960) and RICHMAN (1963) have 
shown, the burden is not only completely shifted to the immobile factors; the 
outflow of capital causes further an excess burden. The implication of the 10 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
reduced capital employment on the residual income out of the immobile 
factors is shown in Figure 1. 














Following HOYT (1991b), also a more general result with an endogenous 
interest rate can be stated. The capital market equilibrium given by 
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+= ⇔ + = ∑∑ . 
In the given symmetric case of identical communities the condition (17) 






=− ⇔ =− since 1 J ≡ . 
Thus, the change of the capital allocation out of the viewpoint of the 
community i as a reaction on a change of the tax rate in i is given by 
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  =+ −  
 
. 
Hence, only iff the capital market is restricted to one region  1 M = , the 
representative policy makers will choose an efficient allocation of private and 
publicly provided goods. With an increase of the relevant capital market area 
the tax rate on capital will be decreased and therefore the supply of public 
provided goods becomes inefficiently low. 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the whole economy, the excess 
burden does not arise. Since in the given symmetric case, any jurisdiction will 
increase the tax rate for the same amount and the capital supply is globally 
fixed, the capital allocation stays unchanged. Thus, the single jurisdiction 
sticks in a ￿prisoner￿s dilemma￿ [BOADWAY and WILDASIN (1984), p. 504] 
which is usually seen as a justification for harmonized capital tax rates or 
other tax instruments especially connected to the immobile factors of 
production. 
However, what happens if the labor market area does not fit exactly with the 
jurisdictions￿ border? For examining the implication of overlapping labor 
markets, we will consider the case of more then one community in each 
region in the following section.  
4  Extended tax competition models with cross-border 
commuting 
4.1  Landownership in each any every community or maximizing 
the utility of the majority  
We will start with the extreme case in which the majority of voters are 
workers without any land endowment as assumed by BECK (1983). Thus, the 
government wants to maximize the utility of a representative worker. For 
simplicity, we consider that the number of landowners is very small compared 
to the number of worker or, alternatively, we completely abstract from the 12 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
presence of local landowners at the jurisdiction. For the purpose of generality, 
we assume that the representative worker possesses also capital. The results of 
this approach are identical with them of a representative household possessing 
land in each and every jurisdiction.
8  
As we focus on the impact of commuting, the direct fiscal externality out of 
the tax exporting via the land rents has to be limited. Thus, the expected 
reduction of the land rent must always be smaller than the expected reduction 
of the tax revenues via the tax base: 
ii
iL K i i i LFd Kd d Kd τ ττ > .    
Neglecting the income out of land rents, equation (9) reduces to 
(21) 
m
ii i i x Nr Kw N =+ . 
With the aim to maximize the utility of the local workers, the government 
plays as before a NASH-game in tax rates, with the assumption that all other 
local authorities do not react on a change of the variable. This leads with the 
given maximization problem: 
(22)  ( ) ,
i
ii i Max U U x z
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, 
with  
                                           
8 The uniformity takes up the results of BRADFORD (1978) and ZODROW and MIESKOWSKI (1986b). For the 




















For an increase of I , meaning more regions M or more jurisdictions J, the 
capital market power of the community shrinks and the effect of the change in 
the tax rate on the global interest rate will be reduced, which reflects 
equation (25).  
Since the wage rate is fixed on the regional level, only an increased number of 
jurisdictions in a region reflected by J , which is equal to an increase of I 
whilst  M stays unchanged, will decrease the labor market power of the 
community.  
Thus, an increasing globalization implies an raising M , and as a reaction of 
the local policy makers, the supply of public goods will be reduced. 









                                           
9 For the derivations see Appendix A. 14 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
This is represented by the falling curve in Figure 2. As pronounced in 
section  3, without cross-border commuting  1 J =  the resulting supply of 
public goods will only be efficient if the regions cooperates or there exists 
only one region  1 M = . However, compared to the standard model presented 
in section 3, the inefficiency is reduced, as the community takes only the 
impact on the labor income into account and neglect the reduction of the land 
rents. 
So which impact of cross-border commuting may be expected? Starting from 
the case of many regions M →∞ with  0 i M dr dτ
→∞ = , an increase in the 
number of the jurisdictions in each region implies also, that the impact of the 
local policy on the regional labor market decreases. Assuming J →∞, 
neither the interest rate nor the regional wage rate is influenced by a change in 
the tax rate at the community i:  0
m
i J dw dτ
→∞ = . Without any influence on 
the income, neither on the wage nor on the interest rate, the first bracket of 
equation (23) is zero, thus for maximizing the utility of the local resident, the 
policy makers have only to maximize the tax revenues. Thus, the benevolent 
government behaves in the same way as a Leviathan State. Since the revenue 
maximizing tax rate is higher than the optimal one, there must be an optimal 
degree of decentralization  * J  even for the case of a full-integrated capital 
market. Furthermore, for every degree of integration on the capital market M 
should also exist an appropriate degree of decentralization within the 
region () ,* M J , ensuring an PARETO-optimal supply of publicly provided 
goods. 
However, as noted already the possibility of tax exporting by the neglecting 
income out of land reduces the inefficiency even without commuting. In the 
following, we will therefore consider different schemes of land ownership for 
having the possibility to compare the results and to separate the impacts. 
Firstly, we will assume that each household owns also land, however, only in   Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  15 
 
the region of living. In a next step, the landownership will be further limited 
to the jurisdiction of residence and thereby we can separate the impact of 
commuting and external land ownership. It will be shown that in fact cross-
border-commuting leads to a decrease of the supply of public goods as the 
problem of tax competition increase. 
4.2  Land ownership is limited to the region of residence 
To neglect completely an income out of land possession seems quite 
restrictive and the assumption of an equal share of land in every community 
unrealistic. Hence, we will now assume that the representative household 
owns also land. However, as mentioned in the introduction, on the local level 
the possession of land outside of the own community of living but limited to 
region seems to be reasonable. As before, the local government wants to 
maximize the utility of the local residents and governments play a NASH-
game in tax rates. Now, using the assumption of a linear homogenous 
production function, the aggregated consumption given by equation (5) can be 
rearranged for having the following maximization problem of the local 
government: 
(27)  ( ) ,
i
ii i Max U U x z
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Inserting the changes of factor incomes in equation (28) and rearranged we 
get
10 
(29)  ( )
1
, 1
ii i i zx K MRS J τ ε
−
  =+    
As expected, the representative community can scatter the reduction of the 
factor income over the communities in the same region. To what extension 
the tax burden can be exported depends on the number of jurisdictions in the 
region. However, the possibility of an indirect tax export would also arise in 
the case of a two-factor model with capital and land combined with the 
assumption of an external landownership.   
Nevertheless, the assumption of cross-border commuting has an additional 
impact on the tax elasticity. For the general result with an endogenous interest 
rate, we start again at the capital market equilibrium. Given equation (4) and 
using the same procedure as before, the impact on the capital allocation as a 
reaction on a change in the tax rate in i is out of the viewpoint of the 
community i:  
(30)  ( )




dr dK dK dK d dN dw
d d d d dN dw d
τ ρ
τ ρτ ρ τ
+
=+ . 
Thus, additionally to the direct impact as in the standard model of ZODROW 
and MIESZKOWSKI, we have to consider a supplementary mechanism via the 
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10 For the detailed derivation see Appendix D. 






Second Indirect Fiscal-Externality 
via Cross-Border-Commuting   Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  17 
 
The impact on the tax base via cross-border-commuting is for  0; 0 NK JF >≠  
definitively negative and leads, as the usual indirect fiscal externality, to a 
reduction of the tax base. The reason for the change in the tax elasticity of 
capital can be explain as follows. As an outflow of capital would also reduce 
the wage rate in the community, the labor force will partly shift to other 
communities in the region. This reduction of labor input at the community i 
cuts further the productivity of capital in the jurisdiction. 
The last point will be to show that the stated direct fiscal externality in form 
of a tax export is completely introduced by the considered structure of 
landownership. In the next chapter, we will therefore limit the possession of 
land to the jurisdiction of residence. 
4.3  Land ownership is limited to the community of residence  
For the case of a limited landownership to the community of residence, the 
income out of land rents is equal to the local land rents 
ii i
i yN lL = . 
Again, the local government wants to maximize the utility of the local 
residents and governments play a NASH-game in tax rates. Now, the 
aggregated consumption given by equation (5) can be reduced for having the 
following maximization problem of the local government: 
(32)  ( ) ,
i
ii i Max U U x z
τ =  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) .. , ,
ii i m i i
ii i i i i
i
ii




=+ − + − −
=
 
The first order condition is therefore given by: 
(33)  () () 0
mi
ii i i ii
ii i
ii i i i
UU rw K
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As in the symmetric case of identical regions the second and the third term in 
the first bracket are zero, equation (33) simplifies to 18 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
(34)  ( )
1
, 1
ii i i zx K MRS τ ε
−
=+ . 
Thus, the shift of the tax burden to other communities in the region was 
completely caused by the considered distribution of land; but the tax elasticity 
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  − ∂  == − +    ∂  −    
. 
Which is equal to equation (19) for  1 J = . Therefore, we can state : 
 
Decentralization, implying overlapping labor market areas, decreases the 
supply of public goods and increases the inefficiency. Only if the 
decentralization entails an external landownership at the same time, the 
inefficient low supply of publicly provided goods at resulting equilibrium 
may be increased. 
 
The result is only in the first moment ambiguous. Since labor becomes a 
mobile factor like capital, the impact must be the same. If the factor labor is 
inter-jurisdictional mobile, it can shift, in the same way as capital, the burden 
to the remaining immobile factor land.     
5 Conclusion 
The paper extends the familiar standard tax competition model for the 
possibility of commuting by introducing a new level of jurisdictions in the 
sense of a local government on the level of communities. For separating the 
impact of landownership and cross-border commuting, different schemes of 
landownership have been considered. It has been shown that the possibility of 
cross-border commuting increases the problem of tax competition as an 
additional indirect fiscal externality arises via the potential reallocation of 
labor. With the possibility of cross-border commuting, the change in the   Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  19 
 
supply of publicly provided goods - whether an increase or a decrease - 
depends crucial on the assumed structure of landownership. If the tax burden 
can be exported via external possession of land the undersupply of publicly 
provided goods will be reduced and in the extreme case, an oversupply may 
arise. If the land possession is limited to local residents, cross-border 
commuting will increase the problem of an undersupply of the public activity, 
as an additional indirect fiscal externality arises. 
Different aspects have been neglected in the paper, which open a wide area 
for future research. Besides of land there might be also a public input 
considered which prosper capital and labor productivity as well. Furthermore, 
up to this point household mobility, asymmetric endowments, and land for the 
purpose of housing are completely neglected. 
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6 Annex 
For increasing the readability, the following convention concerning the 
indices is introduced: 
: jm j =  for any other jurisdiction than i in the same region. 
: mm j =  for any jurisdiction in an other region than i. 
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The land market has to be cleared on the local level which implies: 
(A8) 
i i ii ii
KN lL F KF NF =− −  with  
(A9) 
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i LL =  
















































































dd d τ ττ
⇔= − + −  
For the derivation of the expected change in the labor allocation 
i
i dN dτ ;
j
i dN dτ , we start by (A10) and add (A11), considering 
:
mij ww w == and  :
ij
NN NN NN F FF ==,  :
ij
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dd F dd τ ττ τ
 
−= −  
 
 
Then by equating (A13) and (A14) under consideration of  :
ij rrr == and 
:
ij
KK KK KK F FF ==,  :
ij
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For the expected change in the labor allocation outside of i, we need only to 
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For the expected change in the capital allocation  i dK dτ , we substitute (A12) 






















dJ d d ττ τ
     =+ − −   
   
. 










= −− , 
adding (A15) and taking into account that 
m







dM J F τ
= −> . 
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Finally for the expected change in the capital allocation in i, we combine 
(A16), (A24) and (A25) for obtaining after rearranging: 
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F JI dK
dF J I FF F τ
  −−
  =+
  −  
<0 
Or by considering (A26) instead of (A25): 
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For the impact on the interest rate  i dr dτ  we need only to substitute (A24) in  







For the expected change in the wage rate 
m
i dw dτ , we start with (A11) under 
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Annex B: 
In this appendix it will be shown, that the assumption of an absent landlord is 
equal to the case of a representative household possessing land in each and 
every jurisdiction.Formel-Kapitel (n￿chstes) Abschnitt 2 
(B1)  ( ) ,
i
ii i Max U U x z
τ =  
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==
= ∑∑  hold in the case of a 
symmetric factor endowment in all jurisdictions with 
ijm N NN ==, 
ijm KKK ==, 
ijm LLL ==.  
The total change of land rents can be rewritten as: 
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(B4)-(B6) can be restated as: 






































Insert in (B3) finishes the proof.         Fiscal Competition on the Local Level  25 
 
Annex C Formelabschnitt  3 
Combining the first order condition given by equation (B2) with (A29), (A31) 
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Thus for J →∞,  , 0
ii zx MRS →  holds.  
For the non-overlapping labor market area, we get with  1 J = : 





















which implies for the limited tax export 
ii
iL K i i i iL K i LF dK d dK d LF τ ττ τ >⇔ < : 
 
  , 1, 1 1
ii zxJM MRS


























Taking both together and taking into account that (C2) decreases 
monotonically in J , we get directly to the point that there must be a  * J  
which insures for any  1 M >  even for M →∞ that  , 1
ii zx MRS =  holds.       26 Holger  K￿chelein 
 
Annex DFormelabschnitt  4 
This appendix provides a more detailed derivation of equation (28) in the text: 





































Then inserting (A31), (A29), (B4)￿, (B5)￿ in the numerator and (A27) in the 
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Using three times the characteristic of the production function that 
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